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IN rfHE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WEYHEH CONSTRUCTION
COl\IPANY,
Plaintiff and .Appellant,
-n;,-

F1'AH STATE ROAD
CO'.\DIISSION,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case
No.10307

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Weyher Construction Company, Appellant, brought this
action in the District Court against the Utah State Road
Commission when it incurred extra costs in the amount
of $15,667.12 due to alleged inadequacy of plans and
specificatious drawn up by the Utah State Road Commission for the construction of a storm sewer, and for
$1,850.00 withheld by the Road Commission as liquidated
damages. The State Road Commission contended that
the plans and specifications were perfectly and completely adequate, and that the Appellant was not entitled
to any additional costs over and above the contract price,
1

and that the Road Commission \vas entitled to $1/tiO.O(i
as liquidated damages in that the Appellant did not eow.
plete the contract on time.
DISPOSITION IN LO"\VER COUR'r
The Trial Court, after hearing all the evidence, held
that the plans and specifications were adequate>, and that
the modifications of the plans were made at the request
of the Appellant for its sole benefit. 'l1lte Trial Comt
accordingly awarded judgment in f;wor of the Road
Commission, as to the extra costs im·mTed, of 110 rn 11 ,~
of action, and gaYe judgment to the Appellant i11 tl1r'
sum of $1,850.00, being the amount \Yithhrld by the Rua([
Commission as liquidated damages.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant, "\Veyher Construction Compam,
seeks reversal of the judgment of the Trial Court rendered in favor of the Road Commission of no eanse 0f
action in regard to Appellant's claim for ex1ra eosts.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent agrees with the Appellant's Statement of Facts, except for the following particulars:
1. The Appellant's claim that the 60-inch drain \\'as
inadequate to handle the water, and, therefore, the plan>
and specifications were inadequate, is not supported h!
the evidence produced in the trial. The e\'iclencr show'
that the 60-inch drain was adequate to handle the water
2

::iii! \I 011

ld lw vc lwrnllell the water, if tbe diversion had

C'.OJ1strueted in tlw first instance.
18:3, '.?17 awl 2:31) and (ExhilJit 5-P).

1icr·11 prop<~rly
1~u,

(R. 132,

Tl1r facts further shffw that the construction work
\\:l~ n1rric·d out suhstantial1~T as contemplated under the
ori~·iwd sp('cifieations; that is, in the dry, using the 60j11ch Jin(' m; <l <lin~rsion. (R. 107.)
The Respornlent further states that the facts inrlirntr ~\11~T cl1m1g('S that were macle in the specifications
1•r·n· made at the snl(' re<Juest and for the sole benefit of
!lw ,\ppellant, and, if the changes ·were accepted, the~T
l'>i'l't' to lJ<• made at no cost to the Respondent. (Exhibit
:; !)) nnd (R. 1:3'.i.)
~.

:L ,\ i:pr·11nnt 's Statement of Facts in regard to the
rnins a:-: causing flffw of waters down a storm drain
lfon11rl in th(' first paragraph of page 7 of Appellant's
Lri1'f), has no particular '.Talne in regard to this law suit,
as tlil' \Tn]n(' of Exhibits 16-P and 17-P showing what is
the usual summer thunder shower, is very remote in that
thP qtwstion of "what creates a flood" depends upon
hnw much 1vater is deposited, in what area and during
11!tat period of time, and there was no competent evidence placed in the Record as to how much water was
c!Pposited, on what area, at any particular time.
As fnrther facts, the Respondent states that this contract was entered into to replace a City storm drain un1h an agTeement with the City wherein the Citr re1JllP.~h·d i h(' special specification under consideration in
thr law suit. (R. 239.)

3

This construction \Vas macle as a 1rnrt of tl1e '1 JI 1I
state roacl construdion, because of the need to mr_-1·,.
J\ !,\
the storm drain in the area of Interstate road <'Ollslnii·tion at 13th South Street. The special sr)ecificati 011 , cl~
, ,
found on Sheet 10 of the State's Standard Specificatium
(Exhibit 1-P) was specifically requested under ihe R1,_
spondent 's agreement with the City, arnl was made 011
the basis of the City's representations all(l i1H'estii:;ations that the 60-inch parallel storm drain \\'Ould lrnHilic,
the diversion of the \vater expected to flow through t]ij,
storm drain during the months of August, Septemlier
and October. (R. 239 and 245) and (Exhibits 14-P. and
15-D.)
1•

ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT THE
PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR 'l1HE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE STORM DRAT:\
WERE ADEQUATE, \VAS PROPER AXD
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED DURING THE TRIAL.
There was testimony from all of Respondent's 11-itnesses that the original plans and specifications were
adequate, and that the construction could have heen
completed under the original specifira tions, if the con
tractor had built his No. 3 dam first and had not been ~n
timid in regard to getting the construction undenra)·( R. 132, 170, 183, 217 and 231) and (Exhibit 5-P.)
In reviewing the Lower Court's determination, it if
4

1e duty

of the Supreme Court to review the evidence,
~ 1111 1 all inferences fairly to be dra\vn therefrom, in the
Jiglil mo-;t i':worable to the Findings and Judgment. It
is gcncrnl1y umlerstood that the Supreme Court will not
on'rturn the Lower Court's Findings of Fact where there
is sulJstantial evidence in the record to support such
11

findings.

Tt sN~rns to be the Appellant's contention that the
,,pecifirations, as found on Sheet 10 of Exhibit 1-P of the
State's ~ta]](lard Specifications, should take precedence
u1-rr all otli('l' specifications in the contract. The Respondent ('O!ltends that the contract should be read as a \vhole
,11Hl a11 specifications should br taken into consideration
i11 tlit' i11krpretation of the contract.
Srdion 1-2.5 of the State's Standard Specifications
IExliihi t 3-D) provides as follows :
"EXAl\IIN ATION OF PLANS, SPECIFICATIONS, SPECIAL
Pr.onsroNs AND SITE \V ORI{. The bidder is required
to ('Xamine carefully the site of the proposed work,
the proposal, plans, specifications, special provisions and contract forms before submitting a proposal. It is mutually agreed that submission of a
hicl shall be considered prima facie evidence that
the bidder has made> such an examination and is
sntisfic>d as to the conditions to be encountered in
performing- the work and as to the requirements of
the plans, specifications, supplemental specifications, special proYisions, and contract.''
rrl1is section requires that the contractor be satisfied
1ith the eonditions that he is to meet in the execution of

1

l

I

his contract. The contractor, himself, admitted that "
11
made snrh an examination, and "·as satisfied witJ1 -, .I·
·'lll' I
conditions, and eonclnded that it ·would work. (R. 91.)
Respondent coutends that the original plan~ and
specifications were complete and that the contractor could
have conducted the exerution of the contract in accord.
ance with such specifications.
Section 1-9.~ of the State's 8tarnlanl 8peeifieatirJ11,
(Exhibit 3-D) provides that the> contraet()r shall a('rrpl
the compensation as set out in the contract for all loss or
damage arising from the nature of the work or from
normal action of the elements, or from an.Y 1111forC'~e1'11
difficulties which may he e>ncounterecl during the proseC'11tion of the work. This :se>ction of the> e011tract prnYirJP,
that the type of damage for which the Appellmii is attempting to recover as cost:s is contcmplate>cl hy the p~u
ties to be a part of the original contract price.
Section 2-3.1 of Exhibit 3-D pro,·ides that the contractor shall include all neressary equipment and the
construction of all cribs, cofferdams, eaissons, mmaterinabl ek • in his contract prirr in the canvirw:
.
,, out of n11Y
excavation. The Appellant now seeks to recol'Cl' estrn
costs for the unwatering or the carrying out of its rcmstruction in a watered si tua ti on; whereas, it "·as its rcq uirement under the contract to keep thr co11t-Jtrndion
area dry. This requirement was to he carried ont fur
the compensation as set out in the contrnct.

6
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......
II
It seems to he the contention of the Appellant,
tlll'ollg!Jout its brief, that the special construction specifirations, as fouud on Sheet 10 of Exhibit 1-P, super-

sc(les a11d takes precedence over all other provisions of
[he eoutract, and provides that the diversion shall be

accomplished by the method as outlined in the specifica-

tions, and is tantamount to an unqualified representation ancl wnrranty that the 60-inch diversion drain and
rlam were a<lequate. Of course, it is the contention of
tl1L' lfrspornlent that the 60-ineh c:li,Tersion drain was ade111rntP, aml, in fad, Yrns the sole method of diversion duri11g thP period of construction, ancl if the dam had been
properly constructed to begin with, the problem would
110! ha \'P arisen.
However, even if Appellant's contention has some merit that the diversion did not work, the
lm1g11a~c of the specifications should be examined. The
la11gnage pro\Ticles that it may be accomplished. The
nrdi11a1y interpretation of the worcl "may" indicates
tlic> impression of alternatives and also gives the imJ1n>c-:i1111 of choice. It \\·as given as a suggestion and
nltn1w tin~ a ncl not as a requirement.
ln the case of JlacArtl111r Brothers Company v. U11ite1/ Stales, 208 U.S. 6, wlH)re a construction company con-

trnrtr'd with the United States Government to construct
n portion of a canal, it was required to do the work in

ll1e dr~-. There \\Tas a similar condition, as \Ye hm·e in
tl1i.~ eontnid nnde1· consideration at present, in that the

c11 11stniction rompany was required to inform itself of
tl11• 1·r•111li1i011s i nciclen tal to the construction. Leakage of

watc•r 1hroug·h an adjacent pier caused the work to be

7

done in the wet with additional costs. The romt in dcll\ing the contractor the extra eosts states:
·
"In the case at bar th<> Gon~rnment uc1d0rtook,
project aml advcrtisccl fnr l1i<1s for its pcrfrJnr;'.
ance. There was im1iration of the rummer of pcrformanee but there ·was no kno"\\'ledge of imNiliments to pcrformanee; no misrrpresentation nl'
the romlitions, exaggeration of thPm nor eoncealment of them, nor, inlleec1, k11owlcdg0 of them.
To hold the Go,·ernment liahle uncler such c:r_
cumstances would mnke it insurer of thP uniformity of all work anc1 cast upon it respnnsihility for
all of the conditions which a contrnctor ~i~-ht
encounter and make the costs of its projeets always an unknown qnantit~-. ''
This particular case is Yery much in point with tl1e
situation under consideration and distinguishes some of
the cases as relied upon by Appellant in its hrirf. It
distinguishes Hnllerback Y. U'llitrd States, 23:i U.S. lfl:i,
wherein the GoYernment presumed to speak with kno\rledge and authority. It distinguishes ChrisfiP v. Fnitrrl
States, 237 U.S. 234, wherein the Government made a
deceptive representation; and it distinguishrs TT11itcil
States v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 253 U.S. 1, wherein tlie
representations of the Gon~rnment ·were deceptiH.
In MacArthur Brothers Co. v. United StatPs,(supra),
as in the case under consideration, there was no finding of
deception or misrepresentation, nor presuming of tl 1·)
Government to speak with kno·wledge or authority. In
fact, in the case under consideration, the Court made the
determination as a matter of fact that there \\'ere 110 mi~
representations, and that the parties had eqnal lrnowled!!:e

8

of the ronditions.

This determination by the Court is
~houg·ly objected to by the Appellant as being immalirial. It is hard to see why such a finding would be
"immaterial," when it would almost be necessary to have
a Jinrling that the Respondent presumed to speak with
kn1r1dellge and authority, or that there was a misrepresentation, in order to hold the Respondent liable under
the Appellant's legal theory.
The finding, as set out in the MacArthur Brothers
case ( ~upra), is supported by the following cases:
Sr111:rrer et al. Y. State Highway Commission of Kan·
.vis, 80 P. 2d 1109; Co11struction Aggregate CorP.. v. State
r1( Cuw1ecticut, 170 Atlantic 2d 279; Furton et al. v. City
·1f Jfe11asha, 71 F. S. 569; City of East Peoria v. Coleanni,
78 N.K 2d 809; Shappiro v. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232;
Wilson Y. Cattle Ranch Co., 73 Fed. Rep. 994; Spearm v.
T'11itt'd Statrs, 248 U.S. 136, and International Contracting Co. v. Lamont, 155 U.S. 303.

POINT II.
THJ1_J FINDING BY THE TRIAL COURT
rrHAT THE CHANGE IN PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS vVAS REQUESTED BY '\VEYHER WAS PROPER AND ADEQUATELY
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE .
.\ review of the letters and memoranda, as set
out iu gxhibit 5-P, clearly shows the Respondent's intelltion to assume no affirmatiYe liability by reason of any
eiiange in plans and specifications, and that the Respond~ot allowed the Appellant to make such change solely
9

for the Appellant's benefit 102 aml 133.)

a11cl at its reqrn'st. (H.1ilJ

'

At no time cli(l the Respomkut aelrno,\·lc•dgc- tkit l] 11 •
original plans mid specifications \\'e1·e iuacleqnate, ai:il
all of Responcle11t 's letters and memonrnc1a, aR Ret ont j 11
Exhibit G-P, irnlicate that the Rcspo11clc•11t folt the' cri.~i
nal plans ancl specifications should ])e rompliP(l 11·itli,
but that they would consi(ler the change i11 the plans all:!
specifications, as reqnestec1 li~- the A ppellcrnt, if th1·ri
were no additional costs to the Respondc'nt. (R. 13~.)
CONCLUSIQ:{
The whole hasis of the Appelhrnt 's diss;1tisfar-ti1.;1
with the Trial Court's ruling appears to lw its dif'snti;
faction with the Trial Court's Findings of Fart, wherpi11
the Trial Court found that the plans and speC'ifieati011>
for the construction of the storm drain were compleh·h
adequate, and that there was no misrepresrntation in tJi,.
plans and specifications by the Respondent; and that th
Appellant had the same knowledge, or the means to gain
the same knowledge, as the Respondent.
0

Further, the Court found that the Respondent allowed a change in the plans and specifications, at t!JA
request of the Appellant, as an alternate to the plans
shown in the original contract.
The Appellant argues that the plans and sperifirations were inadequate; that the question as to "·hetlier
or not there was any misrepresentation in the plans m:il
10

,('citka1 ions is immaterial; and that the Court erred in
Jioldrng· t lw i the change in the plans and specifications
'.l(IS J'('1jl1<'S1ed by vVeyher.
Yet, no,.vhere in Appcl!nnl 's lll'id is there any argument that the Court's
fi 111 lings of Fact are not supported by competPnt
, 1

t·1·icleuee.
'l'lie Appellant continues to argue the facts presented
in tlH· 'l'ri<d Court and seems to ignore the fact that the
Tnal ('on rt ruled against them in regard to these facts.
Thr A [ipellant appears to argue that it is entitled to
r~C'O\'L'l'Y as a matter of law on the basis that its facts
11rc conr•d; whereas, the determination of the Court was
1!1at its farts ·were not correct - that the p1ans and speciTI('ations ·were adequate; the change in the plans ·was
n·qnested by Appellant, and there was no misrepresentatio11 in Uw plans and specifications. All of these findings of fact are adequately supported by what the
Tiespo11dc11t considers the great weight of evidence presented during the trial of this matter.
If 111e contractor had built his third dam first and
1111! li;1n lwe11 so timid in proceeding with the constructioll, as outlined in the contract, he could have completed
the joh, as originally contracted for, ·without any additiolla] costs. Instend, the contractor wanted assurance
or insurance that he ,-.,·oulcl suffer no loss by reason of
Jl 1 l~sihle nnforese>en difficulties. The State cannot guar'111tcc1 that the contractor \\·ill make a profit, nor that the
r·rn1trnctor will not face unforeseen difficulties in the
eou~trnetion of the project.

11

l
''To hold the Government liable under such eil'cumstances would make it insurer of the uniformity of all work and cast upon it responsibility for
all of the conditions which a contractor might
encounter and make the costs of its projects -always an unknown quantity." (MacArthur Brothers Co. v. United States, supra.)
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN,
Attorney General
JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON,
Assistant Attorney General
612 State Office Building

.Attorneys for Respondent
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